Tampa Bay economy 02/01 (Spring/summer 2001) by University of South Florida. Center for Economic Development Research
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
College of Business Publications College of Business
4-1-2001
Tampa Bay economy 02/01 (Spring/summer
2001)
University of South Florida. Center for Economic Development Research
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/business_pub
Part of the Business Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of
Business Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
University of South Florida. Center for Economic Development Research, "Tampa Bay economy 02/01 (Spring/summer 2001)"
(2001). College of Business Publications. Paper 60.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/business_pub/60
Volume 2, No. 1 Spring/Summer 2001
By Dr. Kenneth Wieand, Director of the Center 
for Economic Development Research
Florida payroll wages and salaries historically have
been below the national average. Chart 1 reports average
U.S. wages and Florida wages from 1989 to 1998. Over
the period Florida wages were 89% of the national aver-
age. Over the same period employment in Florida grew
by an average of 2.6% per year and U.S. employment
grew by 1.3% per year. The difference in employment
growth comes from population in-migration to Florida.1
1. Earnings Disparity Reflects Lower Living Costs.
A number of observers are concerned about the size and
duration of the gap between U.S. wages and Florida
wages. Many of these observers attribute the wage gap to
a preponderance of low skilled jobs in Florida stemming
from the state’s importance as a tourist destination and as
a haven for an older population that demands services but
does not participate in the workforce. Starting from this
premise, many have recommended policies to restructure
Florida’s industrial mix toward higher paying industries
and higher salary occupations. An editorial by the
Chairman of Florida’s Growth Management Study
Commission, in the April 24, 2001 issue of the Tampa
Tribune, calls for policies to raise current wage rates as a
priority for state economic development policy.2 Existing
financial incentive programs use state and local tax refunds
to attract businesses that pay their employees high wages.
Because state and local budgets balance, a tax refund for
someone means that someone else pays higher taxes.
While there are legitimate reasons to assist local and state
economic development agencies to compete in an imperfect
corporate relocation market, subsidies based on wages,
especially subsidies that will raise the taxes paid by residents
and businesses in the state, are a bad idea. Here’s why:
Compelling evidence exists that most of the differences
in wages across regions and metropolitan areas in the
U.S. result from factors that have little to do with the
structure of local industries. This is especially true for
large diverse metropolitan economies such as Tampa-St.
Petersburg-Clearwater, Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, West
Palm Beach, Orlando, and Jacksonville.
The most important factors leading to differences in
regional wages in these areas are: 
• the cost of living, and
• the size and population density 
of the metropolitan area.
We often refer to wages, after they are adjusted for
differences in the cost of living, as “real wages.” A
recent study finds that, while wages in the South are
lower than in the Northeast and Midwest, when adjust-
ed for the cost of living and for amenities wages are
actually higher in the South!3
Lower Florida wages, seen in this light, are not a prob-
lem, but an advantage for the state. Businesses are able to
pay lower wages in Florida. This gives them a cost advan-
tage and allows them to create new jobs. Because living
costs are lower, Florida workers’ real wages are compara-
ble to other states and new employees are attracted to jobs
created in Florida. The cost advantages to Florida busi-
nesses stemming from lower nominal wages and the fact
that the real earnings of Florida’s workers are comparable
to other states combine to explain the strong growth of
population and employment in the state in past decades.
Policies that raise wages by increasing taxes will actu-
ally reduce the cost of living advantages to Florida resi-
dents. Such policies, if followed, will increase employ-
ees’ wage demands, reduce job formation in the state, and
lead to reduced growth and lower economic welfare of
the state’s residents.
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From The Editor. . . 
This issue of The Tampa Bay Economy contains good
news about wages in Florida. There is also a three-part arti-
cle on electricity deregulation that addresses the problems
that California is experiencing and what can be done to pre-
vent the same problems from occurring in Florida. Two arti-
cles on international trade data, an article on migration pat-
terns of Tampa Bay and the South Central Florida regions,
and an update on CEDR’s data center round out the articles
for this journal. 
This issue of the journal is combined for Spring/Summer
2001. Inside the issue are the data inserts for both, 1st and
2nd quarters of 2001.
Congratulations to CEDR for winning the following
awards in the first six months of this year: 
• Best of Class Award for Newsletter/Newspaper/Magazine
and Excellence Award for Web Sites/Multimedia/Other
from the American Economic Development Council.
• Honorable Mention Award for “Financial Services in Tampa
Bay - Growth, Impacts and Opportunities” from ACCRA, a
national economic development research organization.
CEDR offers the only basic economic development course
in Florida that is accredited by the International Economic
Development Council. This year’s course will be held at the
Hilton Garden Inn in Ybor City. Course dates are November
4-9, 2001. For more information regarding the course, con-
tact CEDR at (813) 905-5854.
2. Analyzing Earnings
Differentials.
CEDR studied average
earnings for 198 urban places
in the United States. To
obtain all the data needed it
was necessary to use 1996
data. As Chart 1 shows, the
wage disparity has not
changed over time, and we
believe that the relationships
that held between wages and
location, size, industry struc-
ture and demographic com-
position continue to hold in
2001. The places covered in
the study vary in location,
size, and industry structure.
Included in the sample are 11
Florida cities in Table 1.
The average 1996 annual
earnings of workers in all
198 places was $25,472,
ranging from $18,551 in
Myrtle Beach, South Caro-
lina, to $40,089 in New York
City. CEDR constructed a
statistical model to explain
the variation in the average
earnings across all of the
198 areas.
The first factor we consider
is the cost of living. The cost
of living is important because
workers encountering higher
living costs will demand
higher wages. If employers
are unable to pay them,
employees will begin to move
to other areas where either
wages are higher, the cost of
living is lower, or both. The
most complete comparable
price index for comparing
city living costs is produced
by ACCRA. The ACCRA
index provides comprehen-
sive indices on components
of consumer expenditure and
an aggregate, or overall, cost
of living index that is a
weighted-average of all the
components. The ACCRA
Good News for Florida Economic Developers:
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index is available for over 300 U.S. cities. We used
ACCRA information from the 3rd quarter of 1996. 
Predictably, adjusting nominal wages for the cost of
living results in lower adjusted wages in high cost-of-liv-
ing areas such as New York City, and in higher adjusted
wages in low cost of living areas like Anniston,
Alabama. Table 1 reports annual earnings for selected
cities, the cost of living index, and earnings adjusted by
the statistical model. Note that adjusting for the cost of
living in very high-cost cities, such as New York City;
causes wages to fall dramatically. (New York City is
actually over-adjusted, as the ACCRA index is only
available for Manhattan, where costs are higher than in
the other boroughs of the City.) Adjusted wages for most
Florida cities rise. (See Table 1 on previous page)
The next factor we adjust for is the population size of
the metropolitan area. Population is an interesting fac-
tor. We would expect that the cost of living would be
higher in larger cities as commuting costs and land val-
ues rise. But cost of living adjustment has already been
applied. The question to be asked is “How can a large
city, with high cost of living, compete for businesses
that can locate in any
number of places?”
(Examples are finan-
cial headquarters on
Wall Street or fashion
houses on Madison
Avenue in New York
City.) The question is
puzzling. Economists
assume that there
must be scale
economies associated
with large cities that
give businesses an
edge to offset their
higher labor and real
estate costs. 
Indeed, the model
predicts that, other
things equal, firms in
metropolitan areas that
have between 250,000
and 500,000 residents
are able to pay annual
wages that are $674
higher than cities of
less than 250,000 resi-
dents. Cities with pop-
ulations between
500,001 and 1,000,000
persons can pay $205
more than cities with a
quarter to a half million residents, and cities that have
between 1 and 3 million residents can pay annual wages of
$660 more than the next smaller group. Firms in cities with
populations of between 3 and 7 million can pay wages that
are $1371 more than the next smaller group. And the
model predicts that firms in the very largest cities, with
populations of over 7 million, are actually less competitive
than smaller cities and, and can pay wages that are $474
less than the smallest cities! Nominal wages unadjusted for
cost-of-living, remain higher, but adjusted wages are lower
in the largest cities. 
Table 2 reports payroll earnings in the selected cities
adjusted for both cost of living and population. In order
to make our comparison, we assume that all cities have 
populations between 1 and 3 million persons. Salaries
of the smaller cities, and of the largest class of cities as
well, are adjusted upward. Wages paid by firms in cities
with 3-7 million are adjusted down by $1,371. (See
Table 2)
Note that wage disparity between Florida cities and
cities in other states shrinks further when city size is
taken into account.
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The average wage is a weighted-average of wages in
each of 10 1-digit Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) industry divisions.4 Historically different indus-
tries have paid different wages on average. Retail trade
and services, for instance, have paid lower-than-aver-
age wages. Mining, manufacturing, and communica-
tions, transportation and public utilities have paid high-
er-than-average wages. One would therefore expect
cities with concentrations of lower paying industries to
have lower average wages and cities with concentra-
tions of higher paying industries to have higher average
wages. Table 3 further adjusts annual earnings figures
for industry structure. We compute average earnings as
though each place has the U.S. average industry struc-
ture. Adjusted for industry structure, Ft. Walton Beach,
a retirement community having a large percent of serv-
ice workers, gains in its average earnings. Boston, hav-
ing a large fraction of higher paying financial services
and manufacturing employment, is adjusted downward.
Most large metropolitan areas have strongly diversified
employment bases. Wages in these places are not
strongly affected by adjustment for industrial structure.
(See Table 3)
We make one final adjustment for educational attain-
ment of the workforce. Highly educated workers com-
mand large earnings premia. And indices of educational
attainment vary widely across cities.5 Table 4 further
adjusts for education. (See Table 4 on page 6)
Three large northeastern cities, Boston, New York and
Philadelphia, and the large metropolitan area of Los
Angeles on the West Coast, are rated very highly by the
education index we use. When adjusted for education,
earnings fall dramatically in these cities. Florida cities in
our sample that have low education indices experience
increases in their earnings indices.
3. How Well Does the Model Predict Florida Wages?
The model used for this analysis includes other vari-
ables, such as unionization, state-local tax burden, and eth-
nic composition, to explain wages. When all variables are
considered, one may ask how well the model predicts actu-
al earnings. Table 5 provides this information for all 13
Florida places included in the sample. The second column
reports actual 1996 earnings. Column 3 gives the model’s
predicted earnings for each place and Column 4 provides
the model’s prediction errors. (See Table 5 on page 7)
The model over-predicts Orlando’s earnings by $2,245,
and under-predicts earnings in West Palm Beach by
$2,807. Both of these figures are well within standard
prediction errors of the model, which has a standard error
of $1,705. Earnings in Tampa Bay were over-predicted
by $552, or about 2%. On average, the model over-pre-
dicts Florida earnings
by about 1.5%. The
model may not cap-
ture all the factors that
lead to wage disper-
sion, and this 1.5%
could represent the
effect of Florida’s
vaunted amenities. But
complex economic phe-
nomena such as payroll
earnings are expected to
exhibit some random-
ness across space. The
prediction errors are rel-
atively small. They may
represent nothing more
than our economy’s
inability to eliminate
short run variations in
labor market conditions
across MSAs. Over-
all, the model does a 
good job of explain-
ing variations in the 
wages across the U.S. 
and within Florida,
explaining over 80%
of the variance in
unadjusted earnings.
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4. Conclusions.
While payroll earnings vary widely across metropol-
itan areas, earnings disparities fall dramatically when
adjusted for factors including the cost-of-living, popu-
lation, industry structure, and education. The standard
deviation of unadjusted earnings, a measure of disper-
sion within the sample of 198 cities, falls by half, from
$3,349 to $1,705 upon adjusting for these four factors.
Examination of Tables 1 - 4 indicates that much of
the observed disparity in wages is eliminated when the
four factors are controlled. Average unadjusted earn-
ings in 11 comparison cities were $31,336 in 1996. In
11 Florida cities unadjusted earnings were $24,482-a
gap of $6,854, or 22% of the comparison city average.
Upon adjustment for the four factors, wages in the 11
comparison cities were $27,988 and in the 11 Florida
cities $26,686-a gap of $1,302, or 4.6% of the compar-
ison city average.
Analysis of the earnings figures for the U.S. and
Florida should make us skeptical of policies designed 
to “reduce the wage gap” by attempting to engineer
changes in a region’s industrial structure. Table 3
demonstrates that
industry structure
in larger diversi-
fied Florida cities,
explains from
$500 to $1,000 of
average earnings.
By contrast, Flor-
ida’s relatively low
cost of living com-
pares favorably
with the compari-
son cities. Florida
cities gain $18 but
the comparison
cities lose $1,700
when adjusted for
cost-of-living. 
The evidence
now is that Flor-
ida’s higher popu-
lation growth is
mainly a result of
lower cost-of-liv-
ing in the state.
Population growth
has been closely
linked to growing
state employment.
Businesses that can
pay lower wages
are more competi-
tive. They can create the jobs filled by new residents
migrating into the state. Lower cost-of-living means
that employees can accept lower money wages without
being worse off in real terms. Thus, lower money
wages are consistent with growing state employment
and population.
On the other hand, educational attainment has a signifi-
cant impact on earnings. Indeed, the higher earnings of
very large cities appear to stem partially from the fact that
they attract highly educated workforces. Education statis-
tics indicate a net movement of more highly educated
persons from smaller cities to larger ones.
Growth management is the arena in which economic
development and issues of quality of life will struggle in
coming years. The challenge facing businesses, state,
and local governments in coming years is to accommo-
date continuing population and employment growth,
while keeping Florida’s cost-of-living low and maintain-
ing the quality of life that Floridians expect. Thus, the
State’s success in providing quality education and infra-
structure in a cost-effective manner is key to sustainable
economic development.
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The estimating model used in this paper.
The model consists of three equations that are jointly
estimated. The variables “payroll earnings”, “labor
force participation rate” and “cost of living” are jointly
estimated because the three variables interact together
as part of the operations of regional labor markets. The
equations are:
Earnings = a0 + a1*cost-of-living + a2*labor-force-par-
ticipation-rate + a3*population0-250000 + a4*
population250000-500000 + a5*population500000-
1000000 + a6*population1000000-3000000 +
a7*population3000000-7000000 + a8*popula-
tion7000000+ a9*tax-burden + a10*poverty-rate +
a11*education-index + a12*African-American-percent 
+ a13*Hispanic-American-percent + a14*Asian-
American-percent + a16*union-percent + a17*agricul-
ture-percent + a18*mining-percent + a19*construction-
percent + a20*manufacturing-percent + a21*TCU-per-
cent + a22*trade-percent + a23*FIRE-percent +
a24*services-percent 
Cost-of-living = b0 + b1*earnings + b2*distance +
b3*population0-250000 + b4*population250000-
500000 + b5*population500000-1000000 + b6*pop-
ulation1000000-3000000 + b7*population3000000-
7000000 + b8*population7000000+ b9*population-
density + b10*tax-burden 
Labor-force-participation-rate = c0 + c1*earnings
+c2*cost-of-living + c3*African-American-percent
+ c4*Hispanic-percent + c5*Asian-American-per-
cent + c6*union-percent + c7*Federal-payment +
c8*age-25-64-percent + c9*New-England-region +
c10*mid-Atlantic-region + c11*mid-south-region +
c12*deep-south-region + c13*midwest-region +
c14*upper-midwest-region + c15*eastern-plains-
region + c16*southwest-region + c17*mountain-
desert-region + c18*California-region + c19*north-
west-region
Results are reported here only for the earnings equa-
tion. In the earnings equation the variable TCU is trans-
portation-communications-utilities, and FIRE is finance-
insurance-real-estate.
R-squares are: Earnings .81; Cost-of-living .66; Labor-
force-participation .66.
End Notes.
1 As part of a nation-wide program reporting unemployment
insurance payments, all enterprises with workers subject to
Florida’s unemployment insurance program are required by the
Florida Agency for Workforce Innovation to report employment
and payroll on a monthly basis. Individual company reports are
the basis for Florida’s ES-202 data set. Each state operates an
ES-202 program. Data from state ES-202 programs allows us to
track and compare employment and employee earnings by stan-
dard industrial classification codes for U.S. counties and metro-
politan areas.
2 Fredrick Leonhardt, “Florida’s economy is study group’s No. 1
priority,” Tampa Tribune, Tuesday, April 24, 2001, Nation/World p. 9.
3 Dumond, M, Hirsch, B, MacPherson, B., “Wage differentials
across labor markets and workers: does cost of living matter?”,
Economic Inquiry v.37 #4, October, 1999. Pp 577-98.
4 These industry divisions are; Agriculture, Mining, Construction,
Primary Goods Manufacturing, Finished Goods Manufacturing,
Communications Transportation and Public Utilities, Wholesale
Trade, Retail Trade, Finance Insurance and Real Estate, and Services
8An Analysis of International Trade 
in the Tampa Bay Area
By Gina B. Space, Economist with the 
Center for Economic Development Research
This article utilizes available export data to examine
Tampa Bay’s metro area level export data. The
International Trade Administration’s metro area level
data, based on the Exporter Location (EL) series identi-
fies countries and world regions that import goods from
Tampa Bay area businesses. The data are available for the
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater metro area and the
Lakeland-Winter Haven metro area. World region and
country-level data are not available for the Sarasota-
Bradenton metro area, but the aggregate value of exports
is released on an annual basis. (Note: The Origin of
Movement (OM) series data are not collected at the sub-
state level so this analysis applies only to export activity,
not production.)
Chart 1 shows the aggregate levels of export activity
for the three metro areas from 1993 to 1999. In 1993, the
Sarasota-Bradenton and Lakeland-Winter Haven MSAs
exported about the same value of merchandise, just over
$185 million. However, from 1993 to 1998, Lakeland-
Winter Haven’s export activity outpaced Sarasota-
Bradenton by a margin of 4 to 1. Lakeland-Winter
Haven’s export increase is probably attributable to
increased sales of agricultural and chemical products.
The Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater MSA exports grew
over 85%, from $1.3 billion in 1993 to $2.4 billion in
1999. Taken as a region, the Tampa-St. Petersburg-
Clearwater MSA accounts for 84% of total exports, the
Lakeland-Winter Haven MSA accounts for 9% and the
Sarasota-Bradenton MSA accounts for 7%. (See Chart 1
on next page)
Exports for the entire Tampa Bay Region (the three
MSAs combined) grew 71% from 1993 to 1999. Since
detail data is not available for the Sarasota-Bradenton
MSA, the following analysis applies to the aggregate of
the Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater and Lakeland-Winter
Haven MSAs, referred to hereafter in this article as Tampa
Bay. However, since Sarasota-Bradenton is a relatively
small amount of the total export value, the analysis would
change only slightly if detail data were available.
Chart 2 displays the value of Tampa Bay’s exports by
the region of the world to which the goods were shipped.
The most striking information presented in this chart is
(1) the dominance of Asia as Tampa’s largest export mar-
ket and (2) the $200 million plus decrease in exports to
Asia between 1995 and 1996. (See Chart 2 on next page)
When the available export data are plotted by country,
China was the largest export destination in 1995 and
showed the most obvious decrease in the value of goods
imported from Tampa Bay in 1996. The data also show
merchandise exports to India dropped significantly in
1996. In fact, China’s and India’s imports from Tampa
Bay decreased $239 million and $83 million, respective-
ly, between 1995 to 1996, for a combined total decrease
of $322 million. Exports to all of Asia declined during
1995-1996 (by $274 million), but by less than the fall in
exports to China and India. Thus, while Tampa Bay’s
merchandise exports to the rest of Asia were increasing
from 1995 to 1996, China and India imported so much
less from Tampa Bay that the overall effect was a net
decrease in exports to Asia.
Because industry and product data are not available at
the metro area level, we must turn to Customs Manage-
ment Center (CMC) level data to try to understand what
caused the massive decrease in export value to China and
India. (Note that CMC data covers numerous ports over a
much larger geographic area than the Tampa Bay Region
and may not always be representative of Tampa Bay’s
exports. See “International Trade Data: What is Available
and What Does it Mean?” in this issue of The Tampa 
Bay Economy.) 
CMC-level export data show that exports from the
North Florida CMC to China decreased from $856 mil-
lion in 1995 to $501 million in 1996, a drop of $355 mil-
lion, larger than the decrease in the EL series data from
Tampa Bay. China’s imports of goods classified under
Chapter 31 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS)
decreased $374 million, exceeding the total decrease from
the CMC, and most likely accounting for the decrease in
Tampa Bay’s exports as well. Chapter 31, broadly classi-
fied as fertilizers, includes natural phosphates, superphos-
phates and ammonium phosphates, all of which are pro-
duced in and exported from the Tampa Bay Region.
Chapter 31 exports make up the vast majority of goods
exported to China through the North Florida CMC, rising
from 83.5% of all exported goods in 1993 to 99.2% in
1999. The next largest export value decrease was in
machinery and mechanical appliances and was less than
1/2 of one percent of the decrease in Chapter 31 value.
Exports to India from the North Florida CMC
decreased $140 million over the same time period, also
exceeding the drop in Tampa Bay’s export value from the
EL series. Similar to China, nearly all of the goods
exported from the North Florida CMC to India are
Chapter 31 fertilizers. The fraction of total export value
attributable to fertilizers rose from a low of 89% in 1996
to 99% in 1998. In 1995, the decrease in the value of
Chapter 31 goods exported from the North Florida CMC
to India exceeded the total decrease in all CMC exports
to India by $3 million. The next largest value decrease
occurred in organic chemicals and was slightly less than
0.3% of the decrease in fertilizer value. 
The substantial de-
crease in phosphate
exports was due in a
large part to the dra-
matic increase in the
price of diammonium
phosphate from 1994 
to 1995. Consequently,
countries purchased
higher than normal
amounts in 1995 to pro-
tect against future price
increases in 1995 and
reduced purchases in
1996 in order to clear
inventories. Monetary
adjustments, such as
the devaluation of the
Indian rupee in 1996,
also contributed to the
depressed international
market in phosphates
and fertilizers.
Thus, it can be gen-
erally concluded that a
decrease in phosphate
fertilizer exports to
China and India
account for the overall
decrease in the value of
merchandise exports
from Tampa Bay
between 1995 and
1996. It is true as well
that the economics that
affect the phosphate
industry, especially the
world demand for
phosphate-based fertil-
izers, have a significant
impact on the value of
goods exported from
the North Florida
CMC and on Tampa
Bay’s merchandise ex-
port value. Customs
district data and Florida
state data show another
dramatic decrease in
phosphate exports for
2000. (Metro area level
export data have not been released for 2000.) Therefore, it
is expected that the EL series data for total exports from
Tampa Bay will show a significant decline in 2000 when
they are released.
Broadening the analysis beyond phosphate fertiliz-
ers, the Tampa Bay Region’s 10 largest export markets
in 1999 (the available data does not list all countries
separately) are ranked in Table 1 on the next page.
These countries have consistently comprised the top
ten export markets since 1993, except for a few occa-
sions: two years India ranked 11th; and one year
France ranked 11th. Canada and China have been the
9
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only countries to rank as either the first or second
largest export market since 1993. Using the same data
series, the Exporter Location series, Florida’s ten
largest export markets are also listed in Table 1. This
data is from the year 2000 EL series data, whereas the
Tampa Bay data is from 1999. (See Table 1)
Although Tampa is geographically positioned in close
proximity to many Latin American countries, and sever-
al of these countries appear in Florida’s list of top ten
export markets, currently the region’s best export mar-
kets are the two NAFTA countries, Asia and Europe.
(Note that Mexico, a Latin American country, is includ-
ed under the NAFTA countries. This is by ITA definition
and is probably intended to assist in monitoring and eval-
uating trade policy.) Why are Tampa’s export markets
different from Florida’s and why are the closest markets
not the largest markets? 
In order to answer the questions, we evaluate Tampa
Bay exports relative to Florida’s. Since we are unable to
determine exactly what products are being exported from
Tampa Bay to our top export markets (recall that the data
is not released by the Census Bureau), we compare
Florida’s merchandise exports to Tampa Bay’s market
share of state output of such merchandise. Using employ-
ment as a proxy for production, we calculate: (1) the per-
centage of regional employment to statewide employ-
ment per 2 digit SIC (or major industry) of export goods
and (2) the overall percentage of regional employment to
total state employment. The regional market share is then
defined as the ratio of the employment percentage for a
given major industry to the overall regional employment
percentage. We refer to this ratio as the market share
ratio, where for export industry i: 
An Analysis of International Trade in the Tampa Bay Area
Continued from page 9
IndustryiExportShareTampa Bay=
This ratio is often referred to as the “location quotient”
for industry i. 
A market share ratio larger than one indicates Tampa
Bay has a larger percentage of workers in a major industry
than is expected if the distribution of industry workers is
proportional across regions. We can interpret this to mean
that Tampa Bay has a specialization in that major industry
relative to other areas in the state. Similarly, a ratio less
than one indicates Tampa Bay does not specialize in pro-
ducing goods in the major industry and a ratio equal to one
indicates Tampa Bay produces such goods in equal pro-
portion to the average Florida region. Table 2 shows
Tampa Bay’s market share ratio for the major goods pro-
ducing export industries. (See Table 2 on next page)
Now that Tampa Bay’s market share ratios are known,
it is necessary to examine which major industries are
most important in Florida’s trade. Florida’s top five major
goods exporting industries and the value of goods export-
ed in 2000 are listed in Table 3 below. This data is aggre-
gated from a list of Florida’s top 50 export markets, by
value of merchandise exported. (See Table 3 on next page)
The five industries listed above consistently make up
the largest value of goods exported to Florida’s top ten
markets. These industries account for over 50% of the
value of exported goods to nine of Florida’s top ten
export markets and over 75% of the value of exported
goods to six of Florida’s top ten export markets. The
Dominican Republic, for which the five industries 
10
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constitute only 38% of export value, is the most diverse
of Florida’s top export markets. Moreover, these five
major industries account for nearly 70% of the value of
all merchandise exports to Florida’s top fifty export mar-
kets. Clearly, SICs 28, 35, 36, 37, and 38 heavily influ-
ence Florida’s export patterns and help determine the top
export markets.
So how does Tampa Bay fare in these five major indus-
tries? Tampa Bay’s market share ratio for four of the five
industries is greater than one, indicating a specialization.
(Tampa Bay does not have a relative specialization in
producing transportation equipment (SIC 37), according
to the market share methodology.) However, only two of
these five industries have a strong degree of specializa-
tion relative to the other major industries in Tampa Bay.
Not surprisingly, chemical and allied products, which
include phosphate and fertilizers, ranks third as Tampa
Bay’s most specialized industry. SIC 38, scientific/ pro-
fessional instruments, photographic/optical goods,
watches & clocks, ranks seventh. 
So while these five export industries may not be
Tampa Bay’s strongest suits, there is still enough region-
al specialization to expect that the countries importing
these goods would be among the largest export markets
for Tampa Bay. Especially notable for Florida’s large
Latin American markets is that the top five industry
exports to Argentina and Columbia consist entirely of
the five industries listed in Table 3. For Venezuela, the
six top industry exports are those same five, plus rubber
and miscellaneous plastics. Only the Dominican
Republic imports a diverse enough basket of goods for
the top five industries to be diluted among the top 13
import industries.
This analysis shows that Tampa Bay does specialize in
producing goods in Florida’s most important export
industries. And this most likely accounts for the fact that
six of Tampa Bay’s top ten export markets are the same as
Florida’s. The remaining four, China, India, Netherlands
and France do not appear on Florida’s list. Why? China
and India, as shown above, mostly import phosphate fer-
tilizers from Florida, which Tampa Bay specializes in and
most of which is shipped through Tampa’s seaport. The
Netherlands and France are more difficult to explain.
Because we do not know for certain what these countries
are importing from Tampa Bay, we cannot know for 
certain why they constitute such large export markets. We
can speculate, however, that since the EL series measures
the value of goods exported by the location of the entity
that effects the export, Tampa Bay must have strong busi-
ness relationships with companies and individuals in the
Netherlands and France. However, this also implies that
the goods produced in Tampa Bay in industries where
Tampa Bay has a high market share ratio are not being
exported by businesses and individuals in Tampa Bay. 
This leads to two possible conclusions: (1) the goods
produced in Tampa Bay are sold in the U.S.; and/or (2)
the goods produced in Tampa Bay are being exported
through businesses and individuals in other parts of
Florida. If the second is true, it presents a challenge to the
Tampa Bay community and economic developers to cre-
ate efficient export channels to discourage the leakage of
exports and promote the business associated with export-
ing these goods.
If detailed EL and OM series export data were available
by zip code or metropolitan area, a much clearer picture
of Tampa Bay’s export trade would be available. This data
would clarify whether Tampa Bay’s merchandise are
being exported internationally or sold domestically with-
in the U.S., and if so, from which region in Florida the
transactions are conducted. It would also assist economic
development professionals in designing, implementing
and targeting effective international trade programs.
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Update on CEDR’s Data Center
By Dr. Dennis Colie, Associate Director of the 
Center for Economic Development Research
There has been a major addition to CEDR’s on-line
Data Center. Data for determining migration patterns are
available. Go to http://cedr.coba.usf.edu and “Query
CEDR Databases.” The Regional and State database sec-
tion now includes MIGRATION.
County-to-county migration flow data shows migration
patterns, by county and time span, based on year-to-year
changes in the addresses entered on individual income
tax returns. This database uses income tax return filings
as a proxy for location of residence. Changes in the loca-
tions of filings are used as proxies for changes in location
of residence. For instance, when a primary taxpayer’s
Social Security Number (SSN) appears on a return filed
in base year 1996 (for the tax year 1995) matches the
SSN on a return filed in 1997 (for tax year 1996), the
county of residence is compared to decide if they were
the same. If the county addresses match, the taxpayer is
a non-migrant. If the county of residence of the return
filed in 1996 does not match the county of residence of
the return filed in 1997, the 1997 taxpayer is considered
an out-migrant from the 1996 county of residence and in-
migrant into the 1997 county of residence.
Migration time spans available are: 1995-1996, 1996-
1997, 1997-1998, and 1998-1999. The years shown rep-
resent the years in which the tax returns were filed.
There are three subsets of the data: inflow, outflow, and
net migration. The inflow subset shows the number of in-
migrants into a selected Florida county by place of ori-
gin. The outflow subset shows the number of out-
migrants from a selected Florida county by place of des-
tination. The net migration subset is total in-migrants
minus total out-migrants for each Florida county and for
the state of Florida.
The county-to-county migration flow data is compiled
by the U.S. Census Bureau from the Internal Revenue
Service’s Individual Master File system. The counts for
personal exemptions represent the actual number of indi-
viduals who were reported on a tax return. These numbers
may differ from year to year due to births, deaths, mar-
riages, and dependents no longer being counted as
exemptions. The number of exemptions does not take into
account any special provisions for blindness or age 65 or
older; these factors are accounted for in the tax computa-
tion portion of a tax return, but not included in the migra-
tion data. Because not all persons file a tax return in a
given year and because the number of exemptions
claimed on a tax return do not necessarily reflect persons
residing at a primary taxpayer’s address, CEDR has
applied an adjustment factor to the data. Over the time
period from 1995 to 1998 the average ratio of Florida’s
estimated population to the total number of exemptions
claimed by primary taxpayers with Florida addresses was
1.18204. Exemptions reported on applicable tax returns
are multiplied by the adjustment factor, 1.18204, to obtain
the migratory approximations reported here by CEDR.
In addition to the migration data, the Regional and State
database section continues to make available the following:
• Cost of Living. This data set provides relative costs of
living for Florida’s 67 counties and is released annually
by the Florida Department of Education. The average cost
of living in a given year (1993 to 2000) among Florida’s
67 counties is set at 100% and then each Florida county’s
relative cost of living is expressed relative to 100%.
• Education Indicators. The indicators in the data set
are graduation rates, drop out rates, SAT scores, average
class size, and per pupil expenditures for Florida’s public
high schools. The Florida Department of Education dis-
tributes the data. CEDR presents the data organized by
county and covering three academic years beginning
with 1996-1997.
• ES202. This data set is a Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) sponsored collection of job and wage data from all
employers participating in Florida’s unemployment
insurance program. It is organized by 1-digit level
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes (and totals
for all SIC codes) and describes the number of units (i.e.
an establishment designated as a single reporting unit for
the unemployment insurance system), the number of
covered employees, total wages of those employees, and
average wages. The data set is partitioned for each
Florida county and provides monthly data (by quarter)
from first quarter 1988 to second quarter 2000. A version
with annual data from 1988 to 1999 is also available.
• Gross Sales. This data is obtained from the Florida
Department of Revenue and is intended as a measure of
economic activity. Gross sales are the sum of taxable and
non-taxable sales as reported by businesses to the Florida
Department of Revenue. The Florida Department of
Revenue reports gross sales and taxable sales to CEDR
by “kind” code. In order to protect the confidentiality of
businesses reporting to the Florida Department of
Revenue, CEDR has aggregated certain kind codes and
converted the aggregations to categories. The data set is
partitioned by Florida county and provides monthly data
from 1994 to 2000.
• Housing Permits. This data set of construction author-
ized by building permits is distributed by the
Manufacturing and Construction Division, Bureau of the
Census. The data set is primarily based on reports submit-
ted to the Bureau by local building permit officials in
response to a mail survey, although some data may be gen-
erated by Census Bureau interviewers or imputed from past
data. The data on CEDR’s web site is organized by state, by
county, and by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) for
each month of a year from January 1996 to December
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By Dr. Dennis Colie,
Associate Director of the
Center for Economic
Development Research
The addition of county-
to-county migration flow
data to the CEDR web
site is announced in a
companion article in this
issue of The Tampa Bay
Economy. The compan-
ion article is titled
“Update on CEDR’s Data
Center.” In this article,
we illustrate the use of migration flow data.
When interpreting the data, some caution is warranted.
Migration flows are imputed from the numbers of exemp-
tions claimed by taxpayers on their federal income tax
returns when there is an address change on year-to-year
filings. There are reasons migrants may not be precisely
counted: 1) a person for whom an exemption is claimed
may not reside in a pri-
mary taxpayer’s house-
hold, 2) households may
own or rent more than one
residence, e.g. “snow
birds,” and file tax returns
from different addresses
year-to-year, and 3) some
households may not file a
federal income tax return.
Tax returns are a poor
proxy for non-U.S. citi-
zens, particularly migrant
workers who frequently
relocate. CEDR applies an
adjustment factor to the number of exemptions to
improve the accuracy of the estimates of migration flows.
As pointed out in this issue’s feature article, “Good
News for Florida Economic Developers: Florida Payroll
Earnings Are Where They Ought to Be,” nominal wages
are lower in Florida than in many other parts of the U.S.
2000. The data describe the number of units and aggregate
value for which building permits have been issued by sin-
gle-family, 2-family, 3&4-family, and 5-family units. 
• Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS). This
labor force data set is prepared monthly by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) and describes labor force partici-
pation, employment, unemployment, and unemployment
rate by county of residence. (Data is also included by
Florida MSA.) The self-employed are counted as
employed persons in the LAUS data. The LAUS esti-
mates are based on a combination of data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS), unemployment insur-
ance claim data, the Current Employment Statistics
(CES) survey of establishments, and ES-202 data.
Statewide and Florida counties’ data are available. The
data can be displayed by month from January 1990 to
December 2000. Annual averages are also available.
• Personal Income, per Capita Personal Income, and
Population. These three data sets are organized by coun-
ty, or by MSA, per year and are released annually through
the Regional Economic Information System (REIS) of the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The data is based on
place of employment and reflect annual averages. In pro-
ducing REIS, BEA makes use of data that are byproducts
of the administration of various federal and state programs,
including unemployment insurance, Social Security, feder-
al income taxes, veterans benefits, and military payroll.
Hence, the REIS data series, which includes farming and
non-farming, military and civilian, proprietorships (i.e.
self-employment) and wage and salary employment, are
more comprehensive than ES202 data that covers non-
farming and salary employment only. BEA defines
Personal Income as the current income received by persons
from all sources (including investment income and transfer
payments) minus their personal contributions for social
insurance. Personal income includes both monetary
income (including non-paycheck income such as employ-
er contributions to pensions) and non-monetary income
(such as food stamps and net rental value to owner-occu-
pants of their homes). The REIS county and MSA data are
issued about 16 months after the year in which the obser-
vations were made. Currently the CEDR’s data center has
this information from 1969 to 1998.
Other items that can be found at CEDR’s web site are
reports of recent studies and publications as well as links
to other sites containing data of interest for economic
developers. In addition, you can find information about
USF’s 25th Annual Economic Development Course to be
held at the Ybor City Hilton, near downtown Tampa, on
November 4 to 9, 2001.
CEDR’s on-line data center continues to garner wide
interest. Over the six-month period from December
2000 to May 2001, the web site received an average of
7,282 hits per month (excluding CEDR staff hits). This
was an increase of 841 hits over the previous period,
June to November 2000. During the most recent peri-
od, users remained at the site for an average of 14.3
minutes per visit.
Continued on page 14
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However, when adjusted for a lower cost of living,
Florida’s workers enjoy a real wage, i.e. spending power,
on a par with, or better than other locations, particularly
the Northeast and Midwest states. Coupled with a con-
sideration of Florida’s other amenities such as a very
moderate climate and excellent beaches, the labor market
appears to function as may be expected from economic
theory. The article’s author, Dr. Ken Wieand, concludes,
“The cost advantages to Florida businesses stemming
from lower nominal wages and the fact that real earnings
of Florida’s workers are comparable to other states com-
bine to explain the strong growth of population and
employment in the state in past decades.”
Between 1997 and 1999, the Tampa Bay region experi-
enced a net migration of about 118,000 people.1 In-
migration accounts for all of Tampa Bay’s population
growth. (Over the 1997 to 1999 time span deaths in
excess of births averaged 738 per year.) Annual popula-
tion growth has averaged 1.3% and is expected to contin-
ue at that pace.2 (See Chart 1 on previous page) 
In 1997, 1998, and 1999, Pasco County had the highest
net migration in each year. Manatee County had the
fewest net migrants in 1997, while Hernando County had
the fewest in 1998 and 1999. (See Table 1)
The origins of in-migrants and destinations of out-
migrants are of further interest. Much of the Tampa Bay
county-to-county migration is among adjacent counties.
Table 2 displays the top five origins for in-migrants and
the top five destinations for out-migrants for each of
Tampa Bay’s seven counties. (See Table 2 on page 19)
Interestingly, Suffolk County, New York, regularly
makes the top-five list of places of origin for in-migrants
to Hernando and Pasco Counties. Cook County, Illinois,
often makes the top five list for in-migrants to Pinellas
and Sarasota Counties. There is also a consistent migra-
tion, in and out, between Tampa Bay’s counties and
Miami-Dade and Orange Counties, and to a slightly less
extent between Tampa Bay and Broward County. And,
although not on the top-five list, the presence of MacDill
Airforce Base has a measurable effect on the migration
flows of Hillsborough and Pinellas counties. In the 1997
to 1999 time span, Hillsborough County became the
home of an estimated 3,544 persons who were previous-
ly listed at APO/FPO addresses.3 Over the same period,
2,233 persons left Hillsborough County for APO/FPO
destinations. Similarly, Pinellas County received 913
people from APO/FPO addresses and lost 624 people to
APO/FPO destinations.
In contrast with Tampa Bay’s net migration of nearly
118,000 and average annual population growth of 1.3%
between 1997 and 1999, the South Central Florida
region experienced a net migration of about 15,189
people and an annual population growth rate of 1.2%.4
The population increase in the South Central Florida
region from 1997 to 1999 was 15,426 persons, of
which about 90 percent was due to net migration.5
However, discounting Polk County’s population
increase of 14,671 persons, the population increase of
the other counties is estimated at 755 persons over the
span from 1997 to 1999. (Over the 1997 to 1999 time
span births in excess of deaths averaged 1,530 per year
in the region. Excluding Polk County, births in excess of
deaths averaged 72 per year.) (See Table 3 and Chart 3
on page 20)
Like the Tampa Bay region, much of the county-to-
county migration of the South Central Florida region is
among adjacent counties. However, in contrast with
Tampa Bay there is no county outside Florida that makes
the top-five list of places of origin for in-migrants to a
South Central Florida county. Table 4 shows the top five
origins for in-migrants and the top five destinations for
out-migrants for each of the South Central Florida’s five
counties. (See Table 4 on page 21)
Migration Patterns of the Tampa Bay and the South Central Florida Regions
Continued from page 13
Continued on page 20
15
               
16
Please tear at perfo
ration.
17
               
Pl
ea
se
 te
ar
 a
t p
er
for
a
tio
n.
18
19
Table 2
Tampa Bay Counties - Origins and Destinations
We can also examine the number of migrants moving
from outside Florida (an interstate move), from within
Florida (an intrastate move), or from outside the U.S. (a
foreign move, which includes moving from an APO/FPO
address) into the Tampa Bay region. (See Table 5)
Each year, 1997 through 1999, there were more people
moving into Tampa Bay from outside the state of Florida
than the number making an intrastate move. Among the
Tampa Bay counties, the only county experiencing the
opposite of this trend was Pasco. Pasco County received
more intrastate migrants than interstate migrants each
year. And, while the most populous county in Tampa
Bay, Hillsborough, is also the destination of more out-of-
state migrants than any other county in the region,
Pinellas County annually receives the highest proportion
- over 60% of total migrants - from outside the state.
Although in the aggregate the South Central Florida
region has had more interstate than intrastate in-migrants,
this phenomenon is primarily attributable to Polk County.6
Besides Polk, only Highlands County received more
interstate than intrastate in-migrants. Also, readily notice-
able is the paucity of in-migrants from foreign addresses,
except for Polk. (See Table 6 on next page)
The annual average, from 1997 through 1999, of the
South Central Florida region’s in-migrants has been
48.5% originating within the state of Florida and 50.7%
originating outside the state. Less than 1% migrate into
the region from a location outside the U.S.
An examination of the numbers of migrants and migra-
tion patterns helps to explain a region’s rate of population
change and, to some extent, the changing composition of
the population. Economic developers, local and regional
planners and political decision-makers will allocate
scarce resources more efficiently and improve growth
management strategies when migration flow patterns are
incorporated into analyses.
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Electricity Deregulation: Part I: A Primer
By Dr. Kenneth Wieand, Director of the Center for
Economic Development Research
Recent innovations in the technology of electric
power generation have opened the door for competition
in regional electricity pricing. Policymakers in over
twenty states have responded by experiments in dereg-
ulation. Recent developments associated with deregula-
tion in California—rolling “blackouts”, financial trau-
ma for California utilities, and charges and counter-
charges as to the source of the state’s difficulties—lead
to concern about the role of deregulation of the price of
electric power in the future. This article examines the
possibilities and pitfalls of electric utility deregulation. 
The Production Cycle of a Private Corporation.
The majority of electric utilities in the U.S. are pri-
vately owned corporations. Econo-
mists recognize that private corpo-
rations in a competitive environ-
ment contribute to national eco-
nomic welfare by producing goods
and services desired by the public
at a lower cost in resources than
governments can achieve. They do
so through private markets that
allocate resources efficiently to
achieve lower product costs. Private
corporations operate efficiently
partly because they face market
competition in all phases of their
production cycles. The following
diagram, titled “the private corpo-
ration”, illustrates the production-
cycle of a private corporate enterprise that operates in
competitive markets.
The diagram identifies the owners as individuals and
organizations who own the firm’s outstanding shares of
common stock. Shareholders have purchased equity issued
by the corporation in the capital markets. Firms compete for
capital and investors compete to purchase common stock.
Shareholders select management to run the corporation.
Management’s directive is to maximize the value of the
shareholders’ wealth, measured by the price of the firm’s
common stock. Management accomplishes its goal by
using the cash raised in the capital markets to acquire plant
and equipment. The firm combines these with materials and
labor to produce products and services for sale, and sells its
goods and services in competitive product markets. The
firm’s goal is to maximize cash flows for shareholders. The
cash flow returns to the shareholders as dividends and cap-
ital appreciation of the firm’s stock.
The ratio of the cash flow and the
shareholders’ initial outlay for stock is
the rate of return earned on the share-
holders’ equity. (See chart at left)
Management can issue debt as well
as equity, in order to bring cash into
the firm. If it issues debt, the firm’s
expected cash flow must be large
enough to pay the interest and princi-
pal on the debt and still earn the rate of
return desired by the shareholders.
The firm’s required return on invest-
ment is the ratio of expected cash flow
to the firm’s debt and equity, ROI. 
ROI  = Expected Cash Flow
Debt + Equity
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ENDNOTES
1Migration flow is derived from tax return filings with the
Internal Revenue Service. For example, 1997 migration patterns
are based on a comparison of the address listed on a taxpayer’s
1995 - 1996 return (filed in 1996 for income earned in 1995) with
the address listed on the same taxpayer’s 1996 - 1997 return (filed
in 1997 for income earned in 1996).
2See “Tampa Bay Region: 2000, ECONOMIC MARKET
REPORT,” prepared for the Tampa Bay Partnership by the USF
Center for Economic Development Research. The Tampa Bay region
is defined by the Partnership to encompass Hernando, Hillsborough,
Manatee, Pasco, Pinellas, Polk and Sarasota Counties.
3Armed Forces Postal Operations / Fleet Postal Operations
(APO/FPO) provide mail service for military and certain civilian
personnel stationed outside the contiguous US.
4See “The Status of South Central Florida’s Regional Economy: An
Update,” May 2001, prepared for the Central Florida Regional
Planning Council (CFPRC) by the USF Center for Economic
Development Research. The South Central Florida region is defined
as the CFRPC service area consisting of DeSoto, Hardee, Highlands,
Okeechobee and Polk Counties.
5As defined, Polk County is included in both the Tampa Bay
region and the South Central Florida region. Redefining Tampa
Bay by removing Polk County would decrease the region’s net
migration, 1997 to 1999, from 118,000 to 104,000 but would only
have a negligible effect on the region’s annual population growth
rate of 1.3%. In like manner, redefining South Central Florida by
removing Polk County would decrease that region’s net migration,
1997 to 1999, from 15,189 to 1,362 and leave the remaining coun-
ties of the South Central Florida region with a miniscule 0.4%
annual population growth rate, 1997 to 1999.
6The phenomenon strictly holds in 1996-97 and 1997-98, but
reverses by a slight margin in 1998-99.
Firms often do not earn their ex ante required return, as
events over the production cycle can cause cash flow to
differ from expectations. Thus the capital markets deter-
mine ROI by the perceived riskiness of the firm’s business. 
Economic Efficiency of Private Corporations.
Why do economists argue that private corporations are
efficient? They so argue because, at every step of the pro-
duction cycle, management faces competition.
Management must compete for its workers, its plant and
equipment, and its intermediate goods in the factor mar-
kets. It must compete with other firms to sell its goods in
the product markets. And it must compete in the capital
markets to issue its debt and equity securities and bring
capital into the firm. Shareholder ownership gives the firm
a clear objective to shoot at: The firm must maximize the
value of its common stock. This mandate drives the rest of
management’s activities as competition forces it to pro-
duce quality products at prices that will sell in the market. 
Electric Utilities Have Lacked Competition 
in their Regional Product Markets.
So, we can give three cheers for competitive markets.
But, the situation facing electric utilities is not the same
as the situation facing other, competitive, industries. In
the past, electric utilities have not faced competition in
their product market, that is, in the market for generated
electricity. The lack of competitive pressure has been due
to the nature of the product generated—electricity, and
the way that electricity has been distributed—through
power lines.
In the past the average cost per megawatt hour of elec-
tric power generation declined as the size of the power
plant increased. Because utilities sold the power gener-
ated within a relatively small region, there was insuffi-
cient scope for many plants large enough to produce at a
low unit cost of electricity. A single company could sup-
ply regional electric power needs with a small number of
generating facilities. 
Electric utilities distributed the power across power
lines connected with the generating facilities. Since cus-
tomers require only one set of power lines, a single
regional power company supplier was able to serve all
customers in a region. The region might be a city, a set of
counties, or an area as large as one or more states.
In the past, then, power generation and the regional
system of power lines and connecting facilities mitigated
towards a single supplier. The breakdown of competition
in the product market creates a “natural monopoly” in
the region. Shareholders in a monopoly, in order to boost
their stock prices, can require management to restrict
supply and thus push up the price of the product. 
Regulation of Electric Utilities.
Realizing that unchecked regional electric companies had
the incentive and ability to overcharge customers, states
and municipalities created regulatory agencies whose roles
were to set the prices regional electric companies charged
for electricity. Regulators set the price of electricity by for-
mulas that relate cash flow to the capital invested by power
companies. They established electricity prices that allowed
electric utilities to earn, a publicly set “rate of return” that
was calculated using the ratio of cash flow to invested cap-
ital (ROI above). Thus, regulators determined prices that
electric utilities were allowed to charge customers. Electric
utilities accepted regulated prices in return for an exclusive
franchise for their service areas.
The Decline in Monopoly Power.
Two sets of recent developments have changed the tech-
nology of power generation, reducing the degree of natural
monopoly enjoyed by electric utilities. The first of these has
been the extension of regional “power grids”—networks of
power transmission lines that cover wide areas of the coun-
try. The grid grew as regional power companies connected
to the grid. Now the grid can transmit power over wide
areas. Indeed, it is now possible to deliver generating capac-
ity produced in one region of the country to consumers in
neighboring regions. Power companies have been able to
purchase and sell electricity to one another over the grid.
A second set of technological innovations has centered
around the generation of electric power. It is now possible
to produce electric power efficiently using more compact
power plants. Generation by natural gas provides clean
power at a relatively low cost. Natural gas prices were at
low levels until recently, when they were impacted by
increases in the price of oil. Smaller electricity producers
have been able to access the grid and transmit power across
it. Companies in mining and manufacturing have construct-
ed co-generation plants to power their own operations, sell-
ing the power they don’t need to regional electric compa-
nies. Companies producing power from alternative sources,
such as windmills, have also connected to the grid. 
In summary an element of natural monopoly—the
scale economy of generation of electricity—has been
eroded by the formation of a power grid and through a
decrease in the magnitude of economies of scale in power
generation. The final element of the natural monopoly,
the network of transmission lines that are used to distrib-
ute power to retail customers, remains in place. Electric
utilities remain responsible for the transmission lines
connecting regional customers with the power grid.
The Economics of Electricity Deregulation.
States and localities have realized that the ability of local
power producers to sell electricity to the grid, and to pur-
chase power through the grid from suppliers in other
regions, establishes the precondition for the competitive
supply of electricity. Competition can force producers to set
prices that reflect generating costs. The most important
contribution of deregulation is that it breaks the regulatory
link between the utility’s capital investment and the cash
flow it earns from its business operations. After deregula-
tion, the return on investment to wholesale electricity gen-
eration will be determined by the willingness of the capital
Continued on page 24
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market to supply funds to electricity producers on the basis
of their future earnings. Utilities will compete with other
industries for capital based upon risk and expected return. 
However, as noted above, one element of the natural
monopoly remains—electric utilities still must create and
maintain the system of power lines that connects region-
al customers to generating capacity. The challenge facing
regulators is to deregulate electricity prices while insur-
ing that there is some provider that retains the incentive
to maintain the regional power grid and its connections to
consumers. Eventually, other sources of electric power,
such as photo-voltaic cells, solar panels and wind power
may allow individual consumers to produce their own
electricity, eliminating the need for transmission facili-
ties. That time, however, has not arrived. It is likely,
therefore, that consumers will continue to pay a fee to a
supplier for their connections to the power grid, and that
that fee will be government-regulated.
Power generators are linked to consumers through a
regional power chain. For competition to prevail the
chain must connect power producers and consumers
through the power grid. The regional power chain is
pictured below:
Broadly conceived, the power chain in a region con-
sists of hook-ups with power plants, trunk lines for trans-
mitting power throughout the region (the power grid),
and hook-ups with power service providers (PSPs) serv-
ing final customers. Deregulation, and innovations in the
current regulatory system, must deal with one or more of
the four entities in the power chain. If an entity has sole
control over one or more of the three elements of the
power chain, it retains potential monopoly power. 
Any deregulation process should separate power gen-
eration and power transmission. If the state govern-
ment does not foresee the certainty of competitive
power generation, it should not elect to deregulate the
industry at all. If competitive power generation is a
reality, transmission still must be dealt with in a regu-
latory environment. Financing and operating the power
grid and the PSPs, therefore, is central to the success of
deregulation. Deregulators should keep in mind that
the goal of deregulation is to pass the benefits of com-
petition in the generation of electric power on to the
consumer. As long as this goal is pursued in concert
with market forces rather than in opposition to them,
deregulation should be a success.
One method of controlling the price of power trans-
mission is to designate the RTO as a regulated monopoly,
and to designate one or more regulated monopolies to be
the power service providers (PSPs) for electricity cus-
tomers in a state or region. The prices of transmission are
regulated, not market determined. The RTO purchases
power from competitive power generators and sells to
the PSPs who in turn deliver the power to customers.
Consumers pay market prices for the generated kilowatt
hours, plus a fixed surcharge determined by a formula
that is designed to give the RTO and the PSPs a reason-
able rate of return to cover operations and return on cap-
ital investment. Customers benefit from a competitively
determined price of electricity in the wholesale market,
but are subject to volatility in the price of generated elec-
tricity. However, this volatility may be mitigated through
long-term contracts between the wholesale producers of
electricity and the regulated RTO and PSP that deliver
electric current to the retail customers.
This partial deregulation strategy has been followed in
Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania placed six-year caps on
transmission charges, but has not set low caps on retail
prices, which would discourage new entrants into the
market. One hundred thirty companies supply generated
power in the state, and 600,000 customers have switched
suppliers. Utilities are free to contract for electricity on a
spot and a forward basis. Pennsylvania, by allowing mar-
ket mechanisms to work, has avoided the rigidity that
prevented California’s power industry from adapting to
increases in oil and gas prices.
Another strategy deregulates power generation and
franchises the regional transmission network to the high-
est bidder, much in the same way that television cable
companies are franchised. The government entity sets a
price for transmission and the sells the right to operate
the system for a specified period of time. Franchise fees
are in some manner rebated to the residents of the region.
The franchise method has the advantage of allowing
financial markets to allocate the resources in terms of risk-
adjusted expected returns, the way the market allocates
other resources. Adrawback is that, with a limited time hori-
zon, the franchisee may lack incentive to invest in expansion
of the transmission network. (Traditional regulated electric
monopolies viewed a new facility as a long-term customer
and often extended power connections as a capital invest-
ment. The franchisee, with a possibly shorter investment
period, might not do so.) Opponents of sprawl might not see
this as a drawback, however, preferring that new developers
should pay the full costs for new improvements.
* The Regional Power Chain *
Power Plants The Power Grid (RTO)
Regional Power Service Providers (PSPs)
Consumers
used by the California Power Exchange to accept spot
bids by suppliers (which set prices according to the high-
est accepted bid) and because of the perceived risk of sup-
plying power to financially strapped utilities.
A significant portion of power in California is generat-
ed by publicly owned and managed electric utilities.
Ironically, municipal utilities were not forced to sell off
their generating capacity, and have in fact profiteered by
selling excess power through the California Power
Exchange to the Southern California Edison and Pacific
Gas & Electric at many times their own generating cost.
Furthermore, the state public utility commission prevent-
ed private electricity utilities from entering into forward
contracts (whereby the risk of rising electric prices could
have been hedged) with power companies. Rising costs and
static prices have squeezed cash flow. Operating at a loss,
utilities faced the possibility of forced bankruptcy. 
Utilities have appealed for relief. As a short run solu-
tion, California’s Governor Gray Davis has called on the
state to use tax dollars to assist the state’s utilities. As
costs to the state mounted, he authorized an increase in
the prices paid by electricity consumers. Thus, the polit-
ical dance of death between environmental groups, polit-
ical representatives, regulatory agencies, and electricity
suppliers ultimately resulted in inefficient production
whose higher costs ultimately are being borne, and will
be borne, by firms and residents as taxpayers and con-
sumers. It’s the same old story.
The responsibility for California’s current electricity cri-
sis falls squarely upon the shoulders of State government
and the groups who lobbied for current policies. As a long
run way out of current difficulties Governor Davis has sug-
gested that the State of California, or its regional govern-
ments, might operate electric utilities as public enterprises.
(See the following article: How Florida should Structure
Electricity Deregulation in the Coming Decade.)
In 1996 the State of California changed the system of con-
trols that regulated the State’s electric utility industry. The
result has been referred to as deregulation, but the industry
has in reality been subjected to a new regime of regulations.
The results have been severe disruption in supply, large
fluctuations in the price of electricity in the state, and the
defunding of the State’s two major investor owned utilities;
Pacific Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison.
What has gone wrong? The answer is that California has
provided a classic example of regulatory mismanagement.
Some of the problems have little to do with deregulation at
all, and others have to do with the new system of regulations
imposed upon the industry. The results have been shortages
in available power, financial woes for utilities, and the need
for renewed State intervention.
The problems originated a decade ago in disruptions in
the supply of new plant and equipment—generating
capacity—in California. Disrupting utility operations in
its input markets, the state and its municipalities prevent-
ed power companies from building new generating facil-
ities. Resistance to new plants was fuelled by concerns
about environmental impacts of nuclear power and fossil
fuel-powered plants, and by the absence of other inex-
pensive means of generating electricity. Supply in the
state thus failed to keep up with demand at current prices.
The State’s utilities have been forced to purchase power
from other states to meet steadily rising demand.
The second problem affected the utilities’ power genera-
tion. State legislators in 1997 unanimously passed assem-
bly bill 1890. The bill contained, among other provisions,
one that severed the connection between California utili-
ties’ markets for inputs (coal, oil, and natural gas) and their
markets for products. The bill reduced retail electric rates
by 10% and capped the amount for up to six years. The leg-
islation at the same time required private utilities to sell off
their generating capacity to wholesalers and placed their
transmission facilities under the control of an independent
regional transmission operator (RTO). At the same time,
the wholesale price of electricity was deregulated and rout-
ed through a trading entity referred to as the California
Power Exchange. Private utilities paid the spot price for
electricity supplied through the Exchange by utilities locat-
ed in other states. Electricity deregulation was popular with
the state electorate because consumers were protected from
market-based price increases but stood to gain if power
prices fell. And the trend prior to 1999 had been for gener-
ating costs to decline.
Rapidly increasing prices of fossil fuels and increasing
demand instead drove the price of electricity up because
California utilities experienced rising costs of power gen-
eration. The cost of alternative electric power (the State
linked prices for alternative supplies to the cost of natural
gas) and out-of-state electricity rose as well. The price of
generated power rose even higher because of the formula
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Part III: How Florida Should Structure 
Electricity Deregulation in the Coming Decade
Florida’s electric industry is a mix of 32 municipal utili-
ties, electric cooperatives belonging to the Florida Electric
Cooperative Association, and 5 investor owned utilities:
Florida Power & Light Utility
Florida Power Corporation
Florida Public Utilities
Tampa Electric Company
Gulf Power Corporation
Some of the investor owned companies are subsidiaries
of companies that also own independent generating com-
panies in the state. 
Proposals for Change.
Florida has taken steps to address the new technical
realities in its electric energy market. Legislative acts
passed in 1978 and 1992 accommodated the formation of
a wholesale market for electricity. The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission in 1999 issued Order No. 2000,
which encourages utilities to transfer control of transmis-
sion facilities to regional transmission organizations.
Florida’s electric industry is working to create an inde-
pendent regional transmission organization that will own
or lease Florida’s transmission system. However, the
market remains inaccessible to power companies that do
not serve retail customers. 
On October 9, 2000 the Florida Energy 2020 Study
Commission released its work plan. The commission is
charged to “determine what Florida’s electric energy
needs will be over the next 20 years and how best to sup-
ply those needs in an efficient, affordable, and reliable
manner, while ensuring adequate electric reserves.” The
Commission is tasked with evaluating options for
restructuring Florida’s electric power industry. The
board plans to have final recommendations during the
third quarter of 2001. A proposal of January 26, 2001
before the Commission suggests a new structure for the
state’s power industry that has features in common with
California and Pennsylvania. Under the proposal, elec-
tric utilities would be required to divest themselves of
generating plants. Facilities could be sold to company
affiliates or to independent generating companies.
Generating companies would compete in a competitive
wholesale market. 
Utilities’ transmission facilities would be either sold to
or controlled by an regional transmission organization,
or RTO. The remaining assets and operations, referred to
in the proposal as a “load-serving utility”, would be a
marketing and delivery company that bought power on
the wholesale market. The load serving utility is also
referred to in the literature as a power service provider,
or PSP. We will use this term in the following discussion.
Unlike California, its purchasing strategies could
include long-term contracts and bilateral contracts as
well as spot market purchases. Rates charged to con-
sumers would be subject to regulatory oversight. During
a transition period, the price the PSP would pay—the
price the generating plant would receive—would be sub-
ject to an upward cap, thus protecting the utility and the
consumer from large price increases. The proposal does
not address long-term retail price determination or the
stability of the price of electricity in the long run. The
proposal contains a suggestion for a fuel cost adjustment
mechanism that would allow increases in fuel costs to
flow through to consumers. 
The proposal recognizes the difficulties being experi-
enced in California. However, in its present form, it is
unclear to what extent the proposal would allow the com-
petitive market to dictate wholesale prices.
Structural issues to be resolved include:
❑What scope of activities will be retained by the
state’s electric utilities? Is it prudent to force them to
divest all generating capacity, or can wholesale mar-
ket competition be maintained if the new PSPs retain
back-up generating capacity?
❑Will the PSPs own the RTO or will it be transferred
to a separate entity? Will the PSPs retain ownership
of retail hookups, or will these be transferred to the
RTO, so that the PSPs become nothing more than
sales and marketing companies? Who is responsible
for building new transmission facilities, and how
will they be motivated to do so?
❑ It also is unclear in the long run how PSPs and the
RTO will maintain a spread between their wholesale
cost and the retail price. These uncertainties must be
resolved if private capital is to respond to deregula-
tion and build new generating and delivery capacity.
Florida’s Electric Power Industry 
in the Coming Decade.
Expect disruption in the U.S. power industry as states
experiment with new market and regulatory systems, and
as new technology continues to change the economic
relationship between power suppliers and customers. But
electricity deregulation does not have to be the debacle
that we have witnessed in California. Twenty-four states
have initiated processes to deregulate energy production.
Recent events in California have caused some of these
states to put the process on hold. 
Ratepayers should hope that, as deregulation proceeds
in Florida, policymakers will recognize the role of capital
markets financing the industry and will account for eco-
nomic principles in their plans. There are several eco-
nomic principles that all sides in Florida’s electric power
restructuring debate should acknowledge. Following these
principles should insure that electricity will not become a
drag on the prosperity of the state and its residents.
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employees of the enterprise from the state. Certainly,
public employees unions are some of the most influen-
tial unions in the U.S. today. Suppliers, also, may lobby
the government for advantageous contracts for the sale
of inputs into production. Between them, unions and
suppliers generate upward pressure on costs. 
At the same time,
homeowners and
other business and
consumer groups
pressure the gov-
ernment to keep
the price of the
enterprise’s prod-
ucts and services
low. The state enterprise is caught between rising costs
and static prices. The government is tempted to raise
taxes to subsidize the state enterprise. But taxpayers
resist the state’s attempts to raise taxes.
Competition breaks down in all phases of the production
cycle, and is replaced by pressure politics. Legislators,
under pressure from labor, consumers and taxpayers, often
fail to give management clear direction on production and
pricing policies. The result is that state enterprises end up
with continuing operating losses. Attempts to control costs
by foregoing new investment lead to inefficient production
and higher long run costs. Thus, the state subsidizes the
public entity, costs are high, and prices do not reflect costs.
Artificially low prices encourage consumption, leading to
increased production and more subsidies. 
National governments have been tempted to run budg-
et deficits and print money to cover the subsidies of their
state enterprises. State governments in the U.S. are pre-
vented from employing these devices. The result of pub-
lic ownership at the state level is more likely to be
reduced services and higher taxes. 
How not to do it: Public ownership does not appear to
be a good solution to California’s deregulatory headaches,
nor should it be embraced by other states.
Principle #2. Don’t forget to water your plants.
Potential investors in private corporations must expect
the returns to new investment to earn a competitive return.
Otherwise they will not supply the capital need to create
corporation. Principle #2 holds for power generation,
regional transmission lines, and lines and equipment sup-
plied to customers. Policymakers must ensure that
Florida’s electric industry structure allows investors in all
stages of production and distribution to expect to earn
normal profits on new investment. 
Power generators, if they are forced to compete with one
another, will be unlikely to earn monopoly rents. If compe-
tition is ensured, the state should not regulate the price
charged for generated electricity. Prices fluctuate as market
forces shift. As in other industries, the consumer bears
increased costs, and benefits from periods when costs
decline. If the supply of competitively produced electricity
is regulated, shortages are likely to result. Shortages lead to
Principle #1. Don’t kill the goose that laid the golden egg.
In California, Governor Davis’ proposed solution-pub-
lic ownership-would transfer pricing power to a public
authority, eliminating the counter-productive disconnec-
tion between the retail prices and wholesale prices that
currently creates power shortages. Experience from a
number of countries over the past half century suggest
that a state-run enterprise, over time, accumulates prob-
lems which lead to systematic losses and permanent
public subsidies to the enterprise.
Difficulties with state run enterprises may be summa-
rized in the following figure.
The figure is a public enterprise (or, state enterprise)
counterpart of the diagram of a private corporation
shown in the preceding article, Electricity Deregulation:
a Primer. The major difference between the two dia-
grams is the role of the owners of the company. The pub-
lic enterprise has no equity owners. The owners of the
public enterprise in the following diagram are, at least
conceptually, the residents of the state. Residents are also
stakeholders in their roles as taxpayers and as consumers
of electricity. 
Unlike shareholders, residents have no direct control over
the management of the state enterprise, nor are their fortunes
tied directly to its profitability. As taxpayers they are impact-
ed by taxes and, as consumers, by the cost of electricity—
residents are both “tax investors in” and “consumers of”
electricity. Residents, as voters, control the public enterprise
through their elected officials, who in turn are responsible for
directing the firm’s management. Legislators and executive
branch officials are not selected solely for their management
of the enterprise, however, but on a wide range of issues,
including general fiscal policy, income redistribution, and
social policy. Unlike managers of private corporations, they
have many, often conflicting, goals for the enterprise. 
The experience with public enterprises in many coun-
tries has shown that state ownership multiplies the politi-
cal pressures that have caused the energy crisis in
California. The state, as a political entity and as a monop-
oly utility, is subject to pressures from special interest
groups that seek to influence its management of the utility.
Labor unions, shown in the diagram as large political
contributors and as a voter bloc, attempt to lever their
influence to gain wage and benefit concessions for the Continued on page 28
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tricity below production costs and exhorted consumers to
practice conservation. Authorities bemoaned the fact that
most consumers ignored them. Only recently did the
state regulators allow increased costs to be passed to con-
sumers. This was after they had obligated taxpayers to
buy electricity on behalf of the beleaguered utilities.
Principle #4. Long term contracting.
Electric power cannot be stored economically: It must be
used when it is produced. This characteristic can make budg-
eting for electricity costs for consumers and producers diffi-
cult. Long term contracts and forward contracts are methods
of reducing uncertainty and smoothing expenditures over
time. Under a long-term contract, generators and customers
(independently or through their PSPs) can agree on an aver-
age price for a specified future period. Investors are surer of
earning a required rate of return (ROI), and consumers have
a better handle on the size of their future electric bill. 
How not to do it: In California, fearing utilities would
enter into sweetheart deals that limited competition, reg-
ulators forced utilities to buy all their power on a newly
created exchange on which electricity was traded at spot
market prices.
Principle #5. Be bold! Be bold! Be not too bold!. (The
kiss principle)
While Florida’s restructuring of its electric power indus-
try should be in harmony with economic principles, it is
not wise to develop complicated but untested structures
that are based upon theory not appropriate to the specific
situation, and to foist them on the public. Humility is in
order because it is not usually possible to foresee all the
consequences of regulatory or fiscal actions by govern-
ment. There is much history of well-intended policy ini-
tiatives that, through the “law of unintended conse-
quences”, have led to costly misallocation of resources.
Florida’s best bet for regulatory restructuring is to
articulate clear goals for a revamped electric power
industry that incorporates input from existing providers
as well as state and local regulatory bodies. The structure
should specify the following:
• Who will be permitted to participate in electric
power generation, and under what conditions?
Conditions include capitalization, regulatory review,
access to the power grid, and recovery of stranded
costs. Given the uncertainties facing the industry,
price caps may be introduced, contingent upon the
emergence of monopoly power. Price caps should be
high enough to encourage entry into the market.
• Ownership and control of the RTO. (Including who
shall own the RTO. The RTO may be a cooperative
or a corporation.) How will reimbursement for val-
ued added by the RTO be determined?
• How will value added by PSPs be determined? How
will monopsony power (control of the price of power
by a single PSP in a region of the state) be regulated?
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restrictions in supply, which result in power outages. Power
outages are much more costly than temporary spikes in the
price of electricity. If price rises above the long-term cost
of supply for any period of time, suppliers will add capacity
and return the price to its longer-term equilibrium level.
The overriding consideration for power generating compa-
nies is that competition be assured—that all power suppliers
have equal access to the RTO and, via the PSPs, to the final
consumer. Policymakers in California were concerned that,
if allowed to operate generating facilities, utilities would
limit competition from other power generators. Fearing this
outcome they forced electric utilities to divest their generat-
ing facilities. PSPs should be encouraged to retain some gen-
erating capacity, however, because they are responsible for
ensuring uninterrupted service to customers. PSPs can utilize
owned generating capacity to plan for uninterrupted service.
The RTO and the PSPs do not face competition for cus-
tomers. These entities should be subject to a regulated price
that allows for an expected return sufficient to stimulate
new investment as population and business activity rise.
Once the state has established a regime for insuring
adequate returns to new investment, it must allow the
development of new capacity as demand requires. A
transparent and efficient permitting process that allocates
land for generating capacity and for access to customers,
and streamlined environmental and impact regulations
are critical if a supply of electric power is to be assured. 
The public must be protected from environmental degra-
dation. The regulatory process should require suppliers to
bear the full costs of environmental regulation. Suppliers
in turn must be allowed to pass those costs to consumers.
On the other hand, opponents must not be given scope to
block the development of properly regulated generating
plants, transmission wires, and customer service facilities.
How not to do it: No significant new power generating
capacity has occurred in California for several years, as
projects are tied up in expensive litigation. 
Principle #3. Caveat emptor: Let the Buyer Beware!
An element of principle number two is that demand is
best served by allowing the price paid by consumers to
reflect competitive market conditions, thereby avoiding
artificially created shortages. This principle extends to
the pricing of electricity across periods of peak and slack
demand. The cost of a kilowatt of electricity during peri-
ods of peak demand may be several times that of a kilo-
watt generated in the middle of the night. 
Current technology allows producers to vary the price
according to cost of generation and transmission. It also
enables consumers to be notified of the cost of power on
a continuous basis. Consumers typically respond to price
differentials by shifting a portion of their power usage
from peak hours to slack hours, and by cutting consump-
tion during days or weeks when the price is high. 
How not to do it: California long kept the cost of elec-
  The Economic and Statistics Administration doc-
uments and explains economic and social change
through demographic and economic statistics. The
ESA includes both the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and the Census Bureau.
  The International Trade Administration includes
the Import Administration, the Trade Development
Center, the Office of Market Access and
Compliance, the U.S. Foreign and Commercial
Service, and the Trade Information Center.
  The Import Administration enforces laws and
agreements to prevent unfairly traded imports and
to safeguard jobs and the competitive strength of
American industry.
  The Trade Development Center is U.S. industry’s link
to global markets, working to promote U.S. exports.
  The Office of Market Access and Compliance’s
paramount objectives are to obtain market access
for American firms and workers and to achieve full
compliance by foreign nations with trade agree-
ments they sign with our country. 
  The U.S. Foreign and Commercial Service places
primary emphasis on the promotion of exports of
goods and services from the United States, particu-
larly by small businesses and medium-sized busi-
nesses, and on the protection of United States busi-
ness interests abroad.
  The Trade Information Center is a comprehensive
resource for information on all U.S. Federal
Government export assistance programs.
Among all of these offices, data collection is primarily
the responsibility of the U.S. Census Bureau. The U.S.
International Trade in Goods and Services Report, com-
monly referred to as the FT900, is required by law to be
published on a monthly and cumulative basis by the Census
Bureau. The FT900 includes national-level data on imports
International Trade Data: 
What is Available and What Does it Mean?
By Gina B. Space, Economist with the Center 
for Economic Development Research
The U.S. Government collects abundant data on eco-
nomic activity in the United States and is a primary
source of international trade data. Much data is available
by the location of economic activities and the destination
of products. Source and destination data allow the
researcher to estimate the value of commerce that flows
across our national borders. However, because of regula-
tions on government disclosure, locating and obtaining
data specific to a state, sub-state region or industry or
product code is not always possible. 
Confusion also arises because multiple federal agencies
collect and disseminate international trade data. Among
these agencies are several divisions within the
Department of Commerce (see below); the Customs
Service, housed within the Department of the Treasury;
the International Trade Commission; and the Department
of State. In addition to collecting data on the trading enti-
ty and its products, federal agencies and offices license
exporters, calculate and collect duties, enforce quotas,
conduct research on markets and industries, and connect
U.S. businesses with likely trading partners in other coun-
tries. These offices also administer many other programs
and issue and enforce rules and regulations relating to the
shipment of goods across our international border. 
Within the Department of Commerce, the Bureau of
Export Administration, the Economic and Statistics
Administration, and the International Trade Administration
all have responsibilities relating to international trade.
Within those three Administrations, there are additional
distinct offices with different missions and services. Each
administration’s or office’s mission is defined below:
 The Bureau of Export Administration regulates
the export of critical goods and technologies that
could be used to threaten U.S. national security,
foreign policy or economic interests.
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• What pricing mechanisms will be in place? A spot mar-
ket for electricity must operate, but firms and consumer
should be able to hedge against cost and demand fluc-
tuations using long term contracts or electricity futures.
A timetable should be adhered to as closely as possible.
Undoubtedly there will be changes in the regulatory struc-
ture and in industry structure as the system goes into oper-
ation. However, rules and timetables should be adhered to
as much as possible to allow all actors in the process to
form expectations and to plan operations. Uncertainty will
retard investment and restrict supply, leading to more
costly electricity. Investors should be assured that, should
changes be necessary, the State will cooperate with firms
to help them avoid losses arising solely from changes in
the regulatory process, but not from natural market condi-
tions. Users should be assured that they will be protected
from unforeseen price spikes that result in large windfall
gains to producers and that result solely from the regula-
tory process and not from natural market conditions.
How not to do it: In California, the competitive spot
market established to price electricity controlled all power
supplied to privately owned public utilities but failed to
involve municipal utilities. On the other hand, the price
utilities could charge for power was capped. This untest-
ed market structure failed to perform adequately when
subjected to increased costs of power generation.
Continued on page 30
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of Trade and Economic Analysis, International Trade
Administration, Department of Commerce, publishes
metro area level merchandise exports to selected destina-
tions based on the EL series. However, not all metro areas
are reported due to disclosure regulations. And although
data are reported for each world region total, only select-
ed countries are listed separately from those totals.
Specific sub-state trade data classified by industry or SIC
and country of destination is not available to the public.
While the exporter of record is not necessarily in the same
location as the producer of the export good, there are still
many instances in which the two coincide. In fact, the
Census Bureau estimates that for manufacturing firms which
export, the location of production and the exporter of record
are in the same zip code 88 percent of the time, as measured
by the value of goods exported. In addition, the EL series can
be used to estimate export production in a locale when: there
are few intermediary exporters; manufacturers are espe-
cially prominent exporters; the region is known to produce
the goods being exported; and the value in the EL series is
close to the value in the Origin of Movement series.
The Origin of Movement (OM) series, which has been
collected since 1987, assigns the value of exports to the
original location from which the final product was shipped
to the port of exit (referred to as the “point of origin”). The
OM series was designed to assist transportation planners
and providers in developing the infrastructure necessary to
move goods from within the United States to ports of exit.
Many consider the OM series a better predictor of the
location of production, but the series is also limited.
First, the OM series is a state-based series. The informa-
tion requested during data collection is the state of origin,
not the zip code. Therefore the data cannot be attributed to
a sub-state level, i.e. a county or region. (However, as dis-
cussed above, while the EL series is collected at the sub-
state level, detailed data is not available below the state
level.) Instructions for the OM series advise exporters and
shippers to attribute the value of products to the “point of
origin” as follows: (1) the location of the factory, distribu-
tor, regional warehouse or cargo processing facility — the
state in which the product actually started its journey to the
port of export; (2) the state of the commodity which has
the greatest dollar value in a multi-product shipment; (3)
the “state of consolidation”; or (4) the Foreign Trade Zone
from which the product is shipped. 
A second limitation of the OM series stems from inac-
curate information supplied by intermediary exporters.
The Census Bureau has found that intermediaries pro-
vide the state of their location, as opposed to the state
where the product began its journey, over 50% of the
time for “point of origin” information. A majority of the
remaining intermediaries provide the state in which the
port of exit is located, which often times is not the state
from which the product was shipped.
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and exports by various categories, such as trade in goods,
trade in services, and trade by commodity groupings, by
advanced technology products and by motor vehicle parts.
At the state level, the Census Bureau publishes two data
sets on the value of merchandise exports. (Import data is
discussed below.) Export data at the sub-national level
covers only trade in goods, or merchandise. Coverage of
trade in services is limited to national estimates included
in the FT900. The two data sets available are the Exporter
Location (EL) series and the Origin of Movement (OM)
series. Both the EL and the OM series measure merchan-
dise value on a f.a.s. (free alongside ship) basis. 
The Exporter Location (EL) series was instituted in 1993
to collect data for the purpose of export promotion. The EL
data series assigns the value of the goods exported to the zip
code in which the exporter of record is located. The exporter
of record is technically defined as the “entity which is prin-
cipally responsible for effecting export from the United
States.” The exporter of record is essentially the entity which
sells the merchandise to a foreign buyer. However, the
exporter of record is not necessarily the same as the export
producer, nor are the two necessarily in the same location.
The exporter of record can vary from the producer or
manufacturer of a good for a number of reasons. First, the
exporter of record may be a separate division of a compa-
ny which also produces the good sold. The product may be
manufactured by workers at a plant in one state but sold
through the international division of the firm, whose head-
quarters is located in another state. Second, the company
may sell its product both at home and abroad. The domes-
tic division may be located in a different state than the inter-
national division for various reasons. Third, the exporter of
record may be an intermediary or wholesale trader, as is the
case with many agricultural commodities. The intermedi-
ary exporter may purchase the goods from a producer in
one or more states, transport the goods, and then effect the
export from another state. (Probably one that has a good
shipping port or is close to the final customer.)
By design, the EL series provides information on export
activity. As a result of assigning the value of exports to the
location of the exporter of record, the EL series cannot be
used to approximate the value of export production in a given
location. However, firms do use the EL series to promote and
service export activities; i.e. they provide financing, ship-
ping, travel assistance and communications services to the
exporter, targeting export industries according to the data. 
To a large extent, the EL series can be used by eco-
nomic development professionals to gauge the level of
international commerce, or connectivity, within their dis-
trict. While the data is collected at the zip code level, only
selected sets are available at the sub-state level. State level
data by 2-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) and
by country of destination is available for purchase from
the Census Bureau’s Foreign Trade Division. The Office
ing tariffs, enforcing quotas, collecting statistical data
for policy-makers and adjudicating claims of illegal
import activities such as dumping. Because reasons for
collecting the data are national in scope, import data is
aggregated at the Customs Management Center (CMC,
formerly Customs District) with responsibility for over-
sight of the port where the goods enter the country.
Export data is also collected, aggregated and distributed
at this level and can supplement the EL and OM series
data. (Import/Export data at the port level are available
from the Port Import Export Reporting Service (PIERS)
on a fee basis.) 
CMCs are groupings of international ports of entry in
a given geographic region. Ports may be airports, sea-
ports or land border crossings, and districts can cross
state boundaries. Florida is exclusively and totally
encompassed in two CMCs: the North Florida CMC (for-
merly the Tampa Customs District) and the South Florida
CMC (formerly the Miami Customs District). The ports
assigned to each CMC are listed in Table 1 (see page 32)
and corresponding geographic territories are displayed in
Map 1 (below).
Data available at the CMC level refer simply to the
flow of good through the numerous ports which fall
under a given CMC. While such information can give a
good picture of the level of total port activity in a CMC,
the data describe only the flow of goods and are not
indicative of manufacturing, export activity or consump-
tion levels in a CMC. (Once goods enter the country,
imports can be shipped to any of the 50 states for con-
sumption without being tracked. Likewise, exported
goods can come from any place in the U.S. and the value
of those goods will be attributed to the port’s CMC.)
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This limitation heavily affects allocation of nonmanufac-
tured exports, especially agricultural commodities, since
they are most often marketed and sold through intermedi-
aries. The result is an understatement of export value for
states with a large amount of agricultural production and an
overstatement of export value for states with ports from
which high values of agricultural products are shipped.
Using the EL and OM series together can help provide
a more complete picture of export production and activi-
ty in a given state. The EL series can show broadly what
industries have international connections in a given state.
It can also help export promoters focus on strengthening
the relationships which are so important in doing busi-
ness with other countries. Economic development pro-
fessionals can use this information to connect interrelat-
ed industries to common export markets and vice versa.
The OM series can help define the export activity of
manufacturers within a state. It can identify the industries
and businesses in which the state has a global competi-
tive advantage. Additional analysis and comparison of
the OM series to the industry structure in a state can
highlight particular strengths and advantages which eco-
nomic developers can use to promote international indus-
tries in their states and regions.
When the two show similar patterns and values, the EL
and OM series are a fairly accurate measure the export
activity of a state. Where they differ, other important infor-
mation can be gleaned. For example, an EL series that is
much greater than the OM series for an industry may indi-
cate the state has a geographic advantage with respect to
export activity. That is, it could be that the state and its res-
idents have developed the international relations necessary
to facilitate export activities. Alternatively, there may be a
higher concentration of wholesalers or intermediaries and
therefore good port infrastructure.
Conversely, where the OM series exceeds
the EL series, businesses have chosen to
ship products to another state for export
sales activity. Factors influencing a busi-
ness’ decision to ship out of state include
cost, distance, transportation infrastructure
and providers, port capacities and amenities,
sale through intermediaries, and relation-
ships with service providers and customers.
In sum, opportunities to build a stronger
position in the international trade communi-
ty can be discovered by utilizing both series
and understanding the differences.
While data on merchandise exports are
available in the EL and OM series, data on
merchandise imports are not available in a
completely comparable format. Import
data are collected by the U.S. Census
Bureau, the Customs Service and the
International Trade Commission. The pur-
poses for collecting data on imports
include assessing our national accounts
and trade balances, imposing and collect-
Continued on page 32
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Continued from page 31
An importer or exporter may choose to ship through a port
in the North Florida CMC because the cost of transportation
is more favorable, the time in shipment is minimized, the
business-person has an established relationship with port or
customs staff, and for many other reasons. CMC trade data
can supplement the EL and OM series and can be very help-
ful when trying to explain specific changes in metro-level
trade patterns, but it is really only a measure of port activity.
The limitations of available trade data make it difficult
for economic and trade development officials to com-
pletely understand the structure of international trade
activity within their regions. The lack of trade data at the
sub-state level compounds this problem. 
Without a clear picture of the current level of trade
activity, it is difficult to make decisions on investments
in infrastructure, programs and policies. Moreover,
once decisions are made, it is nearly impossible to
measure their results and effectiveness. In order to have
a solid trade promotion program, based on actual trade
activity, additional trade data with greater industry
detail and levels of geography must be collected and
released. Without this data, international trade activities
will be unnecessarily restricted.
NON-PROFIT ORG.
U.S.POSTAGE
PAID
Tampa,FL
Permit No.257
College of Business Administration
Center for Economic Development Research
1101 Channelside Drive
2nd Floor North
Tampa, FL  33602
